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Abstract
The development of fault-tolerant distributed systems that can tolerate Byzantine behavior
has traditionally been focused on consensus protocols, which support fully-replicated designs.
For the development of more sophisticated high-performance Byzantine distributed systems,
more specialized fault-tolerant communication primitives are necessary, however.
In this paper, we identify an essential communication primitive and study it in depth.
In specifics, we formalize the cluster-sending problem, the problem of sending a message
from one Byzantine cluster to another Byzantine cluster in a reliable manner. We not only
formalize this fundamental problem, but also establish lower bounds on the complexity of
this problem under crash failures and Byzantine failures. Furthermore, we develop practical
cluster-sending protocols that meet these lower bounds and, hence, have optimal complexity.
As such, our work provides a strong foundation for the further exploration of novel designs
that address challenges encountered in fault-tolerant distributed systems.
1 Introduction
Recently, the emergence of blockchain technology has fueled a renewed interest in the develop-
ment of fault-tolerant distributed systems in which some of the participating replicas behave
malicious [2, 6, 9, 12, 14, 16, 19–21, 23, 24, 32, 33, 36, 37, 42]. The main focus of current devel-
opments is mostly limited to fully-replicated systems in which each participating replica has the
same role. The benefit of such a fully-replicated design is that one can rely on readily-available
consensus protocols to implement such a design [10, 28, 39].
We envision the design and development of more sophisticated high-performance Byzantine
systems in which replicas have specialized roles. An example of such a system would be a
sharded geo-scale design in which data is kept in local Byzantine clusters. In such a sharded
geo-scale design, many queries can efficiently be answered by involving only a single cluster. In
this way, a sharded design will often improve scalability and performance when dealing with
massive large-scale databases [34, 40]. For answering more complex queries, we need cooperation
between different clusters, however.
Hence, to enable the design and development of such systems, we need reliable ways for
Byzantine clusters to communicate and cooperate. We believe that the existing consensus
protocols are insufficient to fulfill this aim [1, 3–5, 10, 11, 13, 17, 25–27, 30, 39, 41]: we can run
a single global consensus protocol among all replicas in all clusters to enable sharing of data and
queries, but this would be at high—quadratic—communication costs for all replicas involved
and would eliminate any possible scaling benefits of a clustered design. Indeed, we believe that
there is a pressing need for more specialized Byzantine communication primitives. In this paper
∗A brief announcement of this work will be presented at the 33rd International Symposium on Distributed
Computing (DISC 2019) [22].
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r RB-bcs Omit nC1 > 2fC1 , nC2 > fC2 (fC1 + 1) · (fC2 + 1) O(‖v‖)
RB-brs Byzantine, RS nC1 > 2fC1 , nC2 > fC2 (2fC1 + 1) · (fC2 + 1) O(‖v‖)
RB-bcs Byzantine, RS nC1 > 2fC1 , nC2 > fC2 (fC1 + 1) · (fC2 + 1) O(‖v‖+ fC1)
RB-bcs Byzantine, CS nC1 > 2fC1 , nC2 > fC2 (fC1 + 1) · (fC2 + 1) O(‖v‖)
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PBS-bcs Omit nC1 > 3fC1 , nC2 > 3fC2 O(max(nC1 ,nC2)) (optimal) O(‖v‖)
PBS-brs Byzantine, RS nC1 > 4fC1 , nC2 > 4fC2 O(max(nC1 ,nC2)) (optimal) O(‖v‖)
PBS-bcs Byzantine, RS nC1 > 3fC1 , nC2 > 3fC2 O(max(nC1 ,nC2)) O(‖v‖+ fC1)
PBS-bcs Byzantine, CS nC1 > 3fC1 , nC2 > 3fC2 O(max(nC1 ,nC2)) (optimal) O(‖v‖)
Figure 1: Overview of cluster-sending protocols that sends a value v from cluster C1 to cluster
C2. In the above, RS is shorthand for replica signing, CS is a shorthand for cluster signing, and
PBS is a shorthand for the relevant instances of BS, SPBS, and RPBS, which are protocols that
use (partitioned) bijective sending.
we formalize one such primitive, the cluster-sending problem: the problem of sending a message
from one Byzantine cluster to another Byzantine cluster in a reliable manner that is verifiable
by all replicas involved. Our main contributions are as follows:
(1) We formalize the cluster-sending problem.
(2) We prove strict lower bounds on the complexity of the cluster-sending problem in terms of
the number of messages (when faulty replicas only crash) and the number of signatures
(when faulty replicas can be malicious and messages are signed). In both cases, these lower
bounds are only linear in the size of the clusters involved.
(3) We introduce bijective sending, a powerful technique to reliably send messages between
clusters of roughly the same size. To generalize bijective sending to arbitrary-sized clusters,
we introduce partitioned bijective sending techniques.
(4) For many practical environments, we develop optimal cluster-sending protocols that use
(partitioned) bijective sending and whose complexity matches the lower bounds established.
A full overview of all the environmental conditions we study and corresponding protocols
we propose can be found in Figure 1.
Organization In Section 2, we introduce the terminology used throughout this paper and
formally define the cluster-sending problem. In Section 3, we show how to use reliable broadcasting
as straightforward basic technique to solve the cluster-sending problem in all possible settings.
Next, in Section 4, we prove lower bounds on the complexity of the cluster-sending problem.
Then, in Section 5, we introduce bijective sending, a powerful cluster-sending technique that
performs cluster-sending with minimal communication between clusters of comparable sizes in
which a minority of all replicas are faulty. Next, in Section 6, we introduce partition techniques
that allow for the generalization of bijective sending to clusters of arbitrary sizes. Finally, in
Section 7, we conclude on our findings and discuss avenues for future work.
2 Formalizing the cluster-sending problem
A cluster C is a set of replicas. We write f(C) ⊆ C to denote the set of faulty replicas in C and
nf(C) = C \ f(C) to denote the set of non-faulty replicas in C. We write nC = |C|, fC = |f(C)|, and
nfC = |nf(C)| to denote the number of replicas, faulty replicas, and non-faulty replicas in the
cluster, respectively. We extend the notations f(·), nf(·), n(·), f(·), and nf (·) to arbitrary sets
of replicas. In this work, we consider faulty replicas that can crash, omit messages, or behave
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Byzantine. A crashing replica executes steps correctly up till some point, after which it does not
execute anything. An omitting replica executes steps correctly, but can decide to not send a
message when it should or decide to ignore messages it receives. A Byzantine replica can behave
in arbitrary, possibly coordinated and malicious, manners.
A cluster system S is a finite set of clusters such that communication between replicas in a
cluster is local and communication between clusters is non-local. We assume that there is no
practical bound on local communication (e.g., within a single data center rack), while global
communication is limited, costly, and to be avoided (e.g., between data centers in different
continents). If C1, C2 ∈ S are distinct clusters, then we assume that C1 ∩ C2 = ∅: no replica is
part of two distinct clusters.
Definition 2.1. Let S be a system and C1, C2 ∈ S be two clusters with non-faulty replicas
(nf(C1) 6= ∅ and nf(C2) 6= ∅). The cluster-sending problem is the problem of sending a value v
from C1 to C2 such that:
1. all non-faulty replicas in C2 receive the value v;
2. only if all non-faulty replicas in C1 agree upon sending the value v to C2 will non-faulty
replicas in C2 receive v; and
3. all non-faulty replicas in C1 can confirm that the value v was received.
In the following, we assume asynchronous reliable communication: all messages send by
non-faulty replicas eventually arrive at their destination. None of the protocols we propose
rely on message delivery timings for their correctness. Let C ∈ S be a cluster and r ∈ C be a
replica. We assume that, on receipt of a message m from replica r, one can determine that r
did sent m if r ∈ nf(C); and one can only determine that m was sent by a non-faulty replica
if r ∈ nf(C). Hence, faulty replicas are able to impersonate each other, but are not able to
impersonate non-faulty replicas. We study the cluster-sending problem for Byzantine systems in
two different types of environments:
1. A system provides replica signing if every replica r can sign arbitrary messages m, resulting
in a certificate 〈m〉r. These certificates are non-forgeable and can be constructed only if r
cooperates in constructing them. Based on only the certificate 〈m〉r, anyone can verify
that m was originally supported by r (unless r ∈ f(C)).
2. A system provides cluster signing if it is equipped with a signature scheme that can be
used to cluster-sign arbitrary messages m, resulting in a certificate 〈m〉C . These certificates
are non-forgeable and can be constructed only if all non-faulty replicas in nf(C) cooperate
in constructing them. Based on only the certificate 〈m〉C , anyone can verify that m was
originally supported by all non-faulty replicas in C.
In practice, replica signing can be implemented using digital signatures, which rely on a
public-key cryptography infrastructure [31], and cluster signing can be implemented using
threshold signatures, which are available for some public-key cryptography infrastructures [38].
Let m be a message, C ∈ S a cluster, and r ∈ C a replica. We write ‖v‖ to denote the size of
any arbitrary value v. We assume that the size of certificates 〈m〉r, obtained via replica signing,
and certificates 〈m〉C, obtained via cluster signing, are both linearly upper-bounded by ‖m‖.
More specifically, ‖(m, 〈m〉r)‖ = O(‖m‖) and ‖(m, 〈m〉C)‖ = O(‖m‖).
We notice that cluster signing can be emulated using replica signing. If C ∈ S is a cluster, m
is a message, and non-faulty replicas in nf(C) only provide certificates 〈m〉r if there is consensus
on doing so among all non-faulty replicas in nf(C), then the set {〈m〉r | r ∈ S}, for any set S ⊆ C
with |S| = fC + 1, can be used in the same manner as a cluster certificate 〈m〉C . In this case, we
have ‖(m, 〈m〉C)‖ = O(‖m‖+ fC), however. If we assume only crash or omission failures, then
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Protocol for the sending cluster C1:
1: Agree on v and distribute (v, 〈v〉C1) to all non-faulty replicas in C1.
2: Choose replicas S1 ⊆ C1 with nS1 = fC1 + 1.
3: Choose replicas S2 ⊆ C2 with nS2 = fC2 + 1.
4: for r1 ∈ S1 do
5: for r2 ∈ S2 do
6: r1 sends (v, 〈v〉C1) to r2.
Protocol for the receiving cluster C2:
7: event r2 ∈ nf(C2) receives (w, 〈w〉C1) from a replica in C1 do
8: Broadcast (w, 〈w〉C1) to all replicas in C2.
9: event r′2 ∈ nf(C2) receives (w, 〈w〉C1) from a replica in C2 do
10: r′2 considers w received.
Figure 2: RB-bcs, the
reliable broadcast cluster-
sending protocol that sends
a value v from C1 to C2. We
assume Byzantine failures
and a system that provides
cluster signing.
no replica will ever try to forge messages of other replicas or send messages outside the scope of
the relevant protocol. Hence, in this setting, replica signing or cluster signing does not add any
reliability, implying there is no need for certificates. In this case, we simply emulate replica or
cluster certificates by not including them.
When necessary, we assume that replicas in each cluster C ∈ S can reach agreement on a
value using an off-the-shelf consensus protocol [1, 3–5, 10, 11, 13, 17, 25–27, 30, 39, 41]. In the
best case, when we only have crash failures or when we have synchronous communication and
replica signing (within a cluster), these protocols require nC > 2fC , which we assume to be the
case for all sending clusters.1
In this paper, we use the notation i sgn j, with i, j ≥ 0 and sgn the sign function, to denote i
if j > 0 and 0 otherwise.
3 Cluster-sending via reliable broadcasts
A principle technique used by consensus protocols to guarantee agreement of non-faulty replicas
is message broadcasting (e.g., as used in Paxos and Pbft [10, 11, 28, 29]). We can use message
broadcasting in the construction of simple cluster-sending protocols, which can be used as a
baseline for comparisons.
First, we present a broadcast-based protocol that can operate in a system with Byzantine
failures and cluster certificates. In this protocol, cluster C1 uses a consensus protocol to reach
agreement on a value v. Then, a set S1 ⊆ C1 of fC1 + 1 replicas in C1 and a set S2 ⊆ C2 of fC2 + 1
replicas in C2 are chosen. Finally, each replica in S1 is instructed to broadcast v to all replicas
in S2. Due to the size of S1 and S2, at least one non-faulty replica in C1 will send a value to
a non-faulty replica in C2, which is sufficient to bootstrap receipt and confirmation of v in C2.
The pseudo-code for this protocol, named RB-bcs, can be found in Figure 2. Next, we prove the
correctness of RB-bcs:
Proposition 3.1. Let S be a system with Byzantine failures and cluster signing and let C1, C2 ∈
S . If nC1 > 2fC1 and nC2 > fC2, then RB-bcs satisfies Definition 2.1. The protocol sends
(fC1 + 1) · (fC2 + 1) messages, of size O(‖v‖) each, between C1 and C2.
Proof. Choose S1 ⊆ C1 and S2 ⊆ C2 in accordance with RB-bcs. We have nS1 = fC1 + 1 and
nS2 = fC2 + 1. By construction, we have nfS1 ≥ 1 and nfS2 ≥ 1. Due to Line 6, each replica
r2 ∈ nf(S2) will receive the message (v, 〈v〉C1) from every replica in nf(S1). As nfS1 ≥ 1, every
1Strictly speaking there exist synchronous authenticated consensus protocols that can reach agreement on a
value among all non-faulty replicas even if nC ≤ 2fC , e.g. [15, 35]. Unfortunately, an outside observer—including
other clusters—will never be able to reliable learn this value, as it will never be able to distinguish between the
faulty and the non-faulty replicas.
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Protocol for the sending cluster C1:
1: Agree on v and distribute v to all non-faulty replicas in C1.
2: Choose replicas S1 ⊆ C1 with nS1 = 2fC1 + 1.
3: Choose replicas S2 ⊆ C2 with nS2 = fC2 + 1.
4: for r1 ∈ S1 do
5: for r2 ∈ S2 do
6: r1 sends (v, 〈v〉r1) to r2.
Protocol for the receiving cluster C2:
7: event r2 ∈ nf(C2) receives (w, 〈w〉r′1) from a replica r′1 ∈ C1 do
8: Broadcast (w, 〈w〉r′1) to all replicas in C2.
9: event r′2 ∈ nf(C2) receives fC1 + 1 messages (w, 〈w〉r′1) such that:
(a) each message is sent by a replica in C2; and
(b) each message includes a 〈w〉r′1 from distinct replicas r′1 ∈ C1
do
10: r′2 considers w received.
Figure 3: RB-brs, the
reliable broadcast cluster-
sending protocol that sends
a value v from C1 to C2. We
assume Byzantine failures
and a system that provides
replica signing.
r2 ∈ nf(S2) will meet the condition at Line 7 and broadcast (v, 〈v〉C1) to all replicas in C2.
As nfS2 ≥ 1, each replica r′2 ∈ nf(C2) will meet the condition at Line 9, proving receipt and
confirmation. We have agreement, as 〈v〉C1 is non-forgeable.
As replica signing can emulate cluster signing, RB-bcs can also be used for systems with
only replica signing. Such an emulated solution does require large messages whose size depends
on the size of the sending cluster, however. For systems with replica signing we can improve
on RB-bsv in another manner. We propose RB-brs, for which the pseudo-code can be found in
Figure 3. Next, we prove the correctness of RB-brs:
Proposition 3.2. Let S be a system with Byzantine failures and replica signing and let C1, C2 ∈
S. If nC1 > 2fC1 and nC2 > fC2, then RB-brs satisfies Definition 2.1. The protocol sends
(2fC1 + 1) · (fC2 + 1) messages, of size O(‖v‖) each, between C1 and C2.
Proof. Choose S1 ⊆ C1 and S2 ⊆ C2 in accordance with RB-brs. We have nS1 = 2fC1 + 1 and
nS2 = fC2 + 1. By construction, we have nfS1 ≥ f(C1) + 1 and nfS2 ≥ 1. Due to Line 6, each
replica r2 ∈ nf(S2) will receive messages (v, 〈v〉r1) from every replica in r1 ∈ nf(T1). Hence, r2
will meet the condition at Line 7 for each such message (v, 〈v〉r1) and broadcast these messages
to all replicas in C2. As nfS2 ≥ 1 and nfS1 ≥ fC1 + 1, each replica r′2 ∈ nf(C2) will meet the
condition at Line 9, proving receipt and confirmation.
To prove agreement, we show that only values agreed upon by C1 will be considered received
by non-faulty replicas in nf(C2). Consider a value v′ not agreed upon by C1. Hence, only the
replicas in f(C1) will sign v′. Due to non-forgeability of replica certificates, the only certificates
constructed for v′ are of the form 〈v′〉r1 , r1 ∈ f(C1). Consequently, each replica in C2 can only
receive and broadcast up to fC1 distinct messages of the form (v′, 〈v′〉r′1), r′1 ∈ C1. We conclude
that no non-faulty replica will meet the conditions for v′ at Line 9.
4 Lower bounds for the cluster-sending problem
In the previous sections, we formalized the cluster-sending problem and considered broadcasting-
based protocols to solve this problem. Unfortunately, these broadcasting-based protocols have
high communication costs that, in the worst case, are quadratic in the size of the clusters
involved. To determine whether we can do better than broadcasting, we will study the lower
bound on communication costs for any protocol solving the cluster-sending problem.
First, we consider systems with only crash failures, in which case we can lower bound the
number of messages exchanged. This lower bound is entirely determined by the maximum
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number of messages that can get lost due to faulty replicas not sending messages or ignoring
received messages. In situations in which some replicas need to send or receive multiple messages,
the capabilities of faulty replicas to ignore messages is likewise multiplied. E.g., when the number
of senders outnumbers the receivers, then some receivers must receive multiple messages. As
these receivers could be faulty, this means they could cause loss of multiple messages. By a
thorough analysis, we end up with the following lower bounds:
Theorem 4.1. Let S be a system with crash failures, let C1, C2 ∈ S, and let {i, j} = {1, 2}
such that nCi ≥ nCj . Let qi = (fCi + 1) div nfCj , let ri = (fCi + 1) mod nfCj , and let σi =
qinCj + ri + fCj sgn ri. Any protocol that solves the cluster-sending problem in which C1 sends a
value v to C2 needs to exchange at least σi messages.
Proof. We assume i = 1, j = 2, and nC1 ≥ nC2 . The proof is by contradiction. Hence, assume
that a protocol P can solve the cluster-sending problem using at most σ1 − 1 messages. Consider
a run of P that sends messages M . Without loss of generality, we can assume that |M | = σ1 − 1.
Let R be the top fC2 receivers of messages in M , let S = C2 \R, let MR ⊂M be the messages
received by replicas in R, and let N = M \MR. We notice that nR = fC2 and that nS = nfC2 .
First, we prove that |MR| ≥ q1fC2 + fC2 sgn r1, this by contradiction. Assume |MR| =
q1fC2 + fC2 sgn r1− v, v ≥ 1. Hence, we must have |N | = q1nfC2 + r1 + v− 1. Based on the value
r1, we distinguish two cases. The first case is r1 = 0. In this case, |MR| = q1fC2 − v < q1fC2 and
|N | = q1nfC2 + v − 1 ≥ q1nfC2 . As q1fC2 > |MR|, there must be a replica in R that received
at most q1 − 1 messages. As |N | ≥ q1nfC2 , there must be a replica in S that received at least
q1 messages. The other case is r1 > 0. In this case, |MR| = q1fC2 + fC2 − v < (q1 + 1)fC2 and
|N | = q1nfC2 + r1 + v − 1 > q1nfC2 . As (q1 + 1)fC2 > |MR|, there must be a replica in R that
received at most q1 messages. As |N | > q1nfC2 , there must be a replica in S that received at
least q1 + 1 messages. In both cases, we identified a replica in S that received more messages
than a replica in R, a contradiction. Hence, we must conclude that |MR| ≥ q1fC2 + fC2 sgn r1 and,
consequently, |N | ≤ q1nfC2 + r1 − 1 ≤ fC1 . As nR = fC2 , all replicas in R could have crashed, in
which case only the messages in N are actually received. As |N | ≤ fC1 , all messages in N could
be sent by replicas that have crashed. Hence, in the worst case, no message in M is successfully
sent by a non-faulty replica in C1 and received by a non-faulty replica in C2, implying that P
fails.
Notice that the above lower bounds guarantee the delivery of at least one message. Next,
we look at systems with Byzantine failures and replica signing. In this environment, we prove
a lower bound on the number of certificates exchanged. In this case, the receiving cluster C2
must eventually receive fC1 + 1 distinct certificates signed by distinct replicas in C1. A thorough
analysis reveals the following lower bounds:
Theorem 4.2. Let S be a system with Byzantine failures and replica signing and let C1, C2 ∈ S.
Consider the cluster-sending problem in which C1 sends a value v to C2.
1. Let q1 = (2fC1 + 1) div nfC2, r1 = (2fC1 + 1) mod nfC2, and τ1 = q1nC2 + r1 + fC2 sgn r1. If
nC1 ≥ nC2, then any protocol that solves the cluster-sending problem needs to exchange at
least τ1 certificates of the form 〈v〉r, r ∈ C1.
2. Let q2 = (fC2 + 1) div(nfC1 − fC1), r2 = (fC2 + 1) mod(nfC1 − fC1), and τ2 = q2nC1 + r2 +
2fC1 sgn r2. If nC2 ≥ nC1, then any protocol that solves the cluster-sending problem needs
to exchange at least τ2 certificates of the form 〈v〉r, r ∈ C1.
Proof. For simplicity, we assume that each certificate is send to C2 in an individual message
independent of the other certificates. Hence, each certificate has a sender and a signer (both
replicas in C1) and a receiver (a replica in C2).
First, we prove the case for nC1 ≥ nC2 using contradiction. Assume that a protocol P can
solve the cluster-sending problem using at most τ1 − 1 certificates. Consider a run of P that
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Protocol for the sending cluster C1:
1: Agree on v and distribute (v, 〈v〉C1) to all non-faulty replicas in C1.
2: Choose replicas S1 ⊆ C1 with nS1 = fC1 + fC2 + 1.
3: Choose replicas S2 ⊆ C2 with nS2 = fC1 + fC2 + 1.
4: Choose a bijection b : S1 → S2.
5: for r1 ∈ S1 do
6: r1 sends (v, 〈v〉C1) to b(r1).
Protocol for the receiving cluster C2:
7: See the protocol for the receiving cluster in RB-bcs.
Figure 4: BS-bcs, the bijec-
tive sending cluster-sending
protocol that sends a value
v from C1 to C2. We assume
Byzantine failures and a sys-
tem that provides cluster
signing.
sends messages C, each message representing a single certificate, with |C| = τ1 − 1. Following
the proof of Theorem 4.1, one can show that, in the worst case, at most fC1 messages are sent by
non-faulty replicas in C1 and received by non-faulty replicas in C2. Now consider the situation
in which the faulty replicas in C1 mimic the behavior in C by sending certificates for another
value v′ to the same receivers. For the replicas in C2, the two runs behave the same, as in both
cases at most fC1 certificates for a value, possibly signed by distinct replicas, are received. Hence,
either both runs successfully send values, in which case v′ is received by C2 without agreement,
or both runs fail to send values. In both cases, P fails to solve the cluster-sending problem.
Next, we prove the case for nC2 ≥ nC1 using contradiction. Assume that a protocol P can
solve the cluster-sending problem using at most τ2 − 1 certificates. Consider a run of P that
sends messages C, each message representing a single certificate, with |C| = τ2− 1. Let R be the
top 2fC1 signers of certificates in C, let CR ⊂ C be the certificates signed by replicas in R, and let
D = C \ CR. Via a contradiction argument similar to the one used in the proof of Theorem 4.1,
one can show that |CR| ≥ 2q2fC1 + 2fC1 sgn r and |D| ≤ q2(nfC1 − fC1) + r− 1 = fC2 . As |D| ≤ fC2 ,
all replicas receiving these certificates could have crashed. Hence, the only certificates that are
received by C2 are in CR. Partition CR into two sets of certificates CR,1 and CR,2 such that both
sets contain certificates signed by at most fC1 distinct replicas. As the certificates in CR,1 and
CR,2 are signed by fC1 distinct replicas, one of these sets can contain only certificates signed
by Byzantine replicas. Hence, either CR,1 or CR,2 could certify a non-agreed upon value v
′,
while only the other set certifies v. Consequently, the replicas in C2 cannot distinguish between
receiving an agreed-upon value v or a non-agreed-upon-value v′. We conclude that P fails to
solve the cluster-sending problem.
5 Cluster-sending via bijective sending
In the previous section, we explored lower bounds for the cluster-sending problem. Close
inspection shows that these lower bounds are only linear in the size of the clusters involved,
which is much better than the quadratic bounds of straightforward broadcasting-based protocols.
Hence, there is much room for improvement. Next, we develop bijective sending, a powerful
technique that allows the design of highly efficient cluster-sending protocols. In bijective sending,
cluster C1 uses the consensus protocol to reach agreement on a value v and certificate 〈v〉C1 .
Then, the protocol chooses sets S1 ⊆ C1 and S2 ⊆ C2 of equal size and instruct each replica in
S1 ⊆ C1 to send (v, 〈v〉C1) to a distinct replica in C2. By choosing S1 sufficiently large, we can
guarantee successful cluster-sending. First, we present a bijective-sending protocol for systems
with Byzantine failures and cluster signing. The pseudo-code for this protocol, named BS-bcs,
can be found in Figure 4. Next, we illustrate bijective sending, the underlying technique utilized
by BS-bcs:
Example 5.1. Let S be a system, let C1 = {r1, . . . ,r8} ∈ S with f(C1) = {r1,r3,r4}, and let
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C1:
C2:
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8
r9 r10 r11 r12 r13 r14 r15
Figure 5: Bijection sending from C1 to C2. The
faulty replicas are highlighted using a red back-
ground. The edges connect replicas r ∈ C1
with b(r) ∈ C2. Each solid edge indicates a
message sent and received by non-faulty repli-
cas. Each dashed edge indicates a message
sent or received by a faulty replica.
Protocol for the sending cluster C1:
1: Agree on v and distribute v to all non-faulty replicas in C1.
2: Choose replicas S1 ⊆ C1 with nS1 = 2fC1 + fC2 + 1.
3: Choose replicas S2 ⊆ C2 with nS2 = 2fC1 + fC2 + 1.
4: Choose a bijection b : S1 → S2.
5: for r1 ∈ S1 do
6: r1 sends (v, 〈v〉r1) to b(r1).
Protocol for the receiving cluster C2:
7: See the protocol for the receiving cluster in RB-brs.
Figure 6: BS-brs, the bijec-
tive sending cluster-sending
protocol that sends a value
v from C1 to C2. We assume
Byzantine failures and a sys-
tem that provides replica
signing.
C2 = {r9, . . . ,r15} ∈ S with f(C2) = {r9,r11}. We have fC1 + fC2 + 1 = 6. We choose
S1 = {r2, . . . ,r7}; S2 = {r9, . . . ,r15}; b = {ri → ri+7 | 2 ≤ i ≤ 7}.
In Figure 5, we sketched this situation. Replica r2 sends a valid message to r9. As r9 is faulty,
it might ignore this message. Replicas r3 and r4 are faulty and might not send a valid message.
Additionally, r11 is faulty and might ignore any message it receives. The messages sent from
r5 to r12, from r6 to r13, and from r7 to r14 are all sent by non-faulty replicas to non-faulty
replicas. Hence, these messages all arrive correctly.
Having illustrated the concept of bijective sending, as employed by BS-bcs, we are now ready
to prove correctness of BS-bcs:
Proposition 5.2. Let S be a system with Byzantine failures and cluster signing and let C1, C2 ∈
S. If nC1 > 2fC1 , nC1 > fC1 + fC2 , and nC2 > fC1 + fC2 , then BS-bcs satisfies Definition 2.1. The
protocol sends fC1 + fC2 + 1 messages, of size O(‖v‖) each, between C1 and C2.
Proof. Choose S1 ⊆ C1 and S2 ⊆ C2 in accordance with BS-bcs. We have nS1 = nS2 = fC1+fC2+1.
Let T = {b(r) | r ∈ nf(S1)}. By construction, we have nfS1 = nT ≥ fC2 + 1. Hence, we have
nfT ≥ 1. Due to Line 6, each replica in nf(T ) will receive the message (v, 〈v〉C1) from a distinct
replica in nf(S1) and broadcast (v, 〈v〉C1) to all replicas in C2. As nfT ≥ 1, each replica r′2 ∈ nf(C2)
will receive (v, 〈v〉C1) from a replica in C2. Hence, analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.2, we
can prove receipt, confirmation, and agreement.
As replica signing can emulate cluster signing, BS-bcs can also be used for systems with only
replica signing. Such an emulated solution does require large messages whose size depends on
the size of the sending cluster, however. For systems with replica signing we can utilize bijective
sending in another manner, however. We propose BS-brs, for which the pseudo-code can be
found in Figure 6. Next, we prove the correctness of BS-brs:
Proposition 5.3. Let S be a system with Byzantine failures and replica signing and let C1, C2 ∈
S. If nC1 > 2fC1 + fC2 and nC2 > 2fC1 + fC2, then BS-brs satisfies Definition 2.1. The protocol
sends 2fC1 + fC2 + 1 messages, of size O(‖v‖) each, between C1 and C2.
Proof. Choose S1 ⊆ C1 and S2 ⊆ C2 in accordance with BS-brs. We have nS1 = nS2 =
2fC1 + fC2 + 1. Let T = {b(r) | r ∈ nf(S1)}. By construction, we have nfS1 = nT ≥ fC1 + fC2 + 1.
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Cluster C:
P1
P2
P ′
r1 r2 r3 r4
r5 r6 r7 r8
r9 r10 r11
Figure 7: An example of a 4-partition of a cluster C
with 11 replicas, of which the first five are faulty. The
three partitions are grouped in blue boxes, the faulty
replicas are highlighted using a red background.
Hence, we have nfT ≥ fC1 + 1. Due to Line 6, each replica in nf(T ) will receive the message
(v, 〈v〉r1) from a distinct replica r1 ∈ nf(S1). Hence, analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.2,
we can prove receipt, confirmation, and agreement.
For completeness, we consider the situation in which replica certificates have constant size.
In this case, the presented version of BS-brs performs too much communication. We can correct
this by only letting fC1 + fC2 + 1 replicas send the value v, while all 2fC1 + fC2 + 1 replicas send a
replica certificate.
6 Cluster-sending via partitioning
The bijective sending techniques introduced in the previous section have optimal communication
complexity. Unfortunately, bijective sending is in practice limited to communication between
similar-sized clusters, as it places unrealistic requirements on clusters that vastly differ in size.
Example 6.1. Consider a system S with Byzantine failures and cluster certificates. The cluster
C1 ∈ S wants to send value v to C2 ∈ S. Notice that BS-bcs requires fC1 + fC2 ≤ nC2 . Hence,
when using BS-bcs, the number of faulty replicas in C1 is upper-bounded by nfC2 ≤ nC2 , this
independent of the size of C1.
Next, we show how to generalize bijective sending to arbitrary-sized clusters. We do so by
partitioning the larger-sized cluster into a set of smaller clusters, and then letting sufficient
of these smaller clusters participate independent in bijective sending. First, we introduce the
relevant partitioning notation.
Definition 6.2. LetS be a system with C ∈ S, let P be a subset of the replicas inS, let c > 0 be
a constant, let q = nC div c, and let r = nC mod c. A c-partition partition(P) = {P1, . . . , Pq, P ′}
of P is a partition of the set of replicas P into sets P1, . . . , Pq, P ′ such that nPi = c, 1 ≤ i ≤ q,
and nP ′ = r.
Example 6.3. Let S be a system, let C = {r1, . . . ,r11} ∈ S, and let f(C) = {r1, . . . ,r5}. The set
partition(C) = {P1, P2, P ′} with P1 = {r1, . . . ,r4}, P2 = {r5, . . . ,r8}, and P ′ = {r9,r10,r11} is
a 4-partition of C. The cluster C and the partition partition(C) are illustrated in Figure 7. We have
f(P1) = P1, nf(P1) = ∅, and nP1 = fP1 = 4. Likewise, we have f(P2) = {r5}, nf(P2) = {r6,r7,r8},
nP2 = 4, and fP2 = 1.
Having introduced partitioning, we are ready to generalize bijective sending to non-similar-
sized clusters. Let C1 be the sending cluster and C2 be the receiving cluster. First, we consider
the case nC2 ≤ fC1 + fC2 . The pseudo-code for the protocol, named SPBS-(α,ζ), can be found
in Figure 8. Next, we prove the correctness of specific instances of the protocol for Byzantine
systems that provide either cluster signing or replica signing:
Proposition 6.4. Let S be a system with Byzantine failures and let C1, C2 ∈ S, σ1 as defined
in Theorem 4.1, and τ1 as defined in Theorem 4.2.
1. If S provides cluster signing and σ1 ≤ nC1, then SPBS-(σ1,bcs) satisfies Definition 2.1.
The protocol sends σ1 messages, of size O(‖v‖) each, between C1 and C2.
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Protocol for the sending cluster C1:
1: The agreement step of BS-ζ for value v.
2: Choose replicas P ⊆ C1 with nP = α.
3: Choose a nC2-partition partition(P) of P.
4: for P ∈ partition(P) do
5: Choose replicas Q ⊆ C2 with nQ = nP .
6: Choose a bijection b : P → Q.
7: for r1 ∈ P do
8: Send v from r1 to b(r1) via the send step of BS-ζ.
Protocol for the receiving cluster C2:
9: See the protocol for the receiving cluster in BS-ζ.
Figure 8: SPBS-(α,ζ),
ζ ∈ {bcs, brs}, the sender-
partitioned bijective send-
ing cluster-sending protocol
that sends a value v from C1
to C2. We assume the same
system properties as BS-ζ.
Protocol for the sending cluster C1:
1: The agreement step of BS-ζ for value v.
2: Choose replicas P ⊆ C2 with nP = α.
3: Choose a nC1-partition partition(P) of P.
4: for P ∈ partition(P) do
5: Choose replicas Q ⊆ C1 with nQ = nP .
6: Choose a bijection b : Q→ P .
7: for r1 ∈ Q do
8: Send v from r1 to b(r1) via the send step of BS-ζ.
Protocol for the receiving cluster C2:
9: See the protocol for the receiving cluster in BS-ζ.
Figure 9: RPBS-(α,ζ), ζ ∈
{bcs, brs}, the receiver-
partitioned bijective send-
ing cluster-sending protocol
that sends a value v from C1
to C2. We assume the same
system properties as BS-ζ.
2. If S provides replica signing and τ1 ≤ nC1, then SPBS-(τ1,brs) satisfies Definition 2.1.
The protocol sends τ1 messages, of size O(‖v‖) each, between C1 and C2.
Proof. Let β = (fC1 + 1) in the case of cluster signing and let β = (2fC1 + 1) in the case of replica
signing. Let q = β div nfC2 and r = βmod nfC2 . We have α = qnC2 +r+ fC2 sgn r. Choose P and
choose partition(P) = {P1, . . . , Pq, P ′} in accordance with SPBS-(α,ζ). For each P ∈ P, choose
a Q and b in accordance with SPBS-(α,ζ), and let z(P ) = {r ∈ P | b(r) ∈ f(Q)}. As each such
b has a distinct domain, the union of them is a surjection f : P → nC2 . By construction, we have
nP ′ = r + fC2 sgn r, nz(P ′) ≤ fC2 sgn r, and, for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ q, nPi = nC2 and nz(Pi) = fC2 .
Let V = P \ (⋃P∈partition(P) z(P )). We have
nV ≥ nP − (qfC2 + fC2 sgn r) = (qnC2 + r + fC2 sgn r)− (qfC2 + fC2 sgn r) = qnfC2 + r = β.
Let T = {f(r) | r ∈ nf(V )}. By construction, we have nfT = nT . To complete the proof, we
consider cluster signing and replica signing separately. First, the case for cluster signing. As
nV ≥ β = fC1 + 1, we have nfV ≥ 1. By construction, the replicas in nf(T ) will receive the
messages (v, 〈v〉C1) from the replicas r1 ∈ V . Hence, analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.1,
we can prove receipt, confirmation, and agreement. Finally, the case for replica signing. As
nV ≥ β = 2fC1 + 1, we have nfV ≥ fC1 + 1. By construction, the replicas in nf(T ) will receive the
messages (v, 〈v〉r1) from each replica r1 ∈ V . Hence, analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.2,
we can prove receipt, confirmation, and agreement.
Next, we consider the case nC1 ≤ fC1 + fC2 . The pseudo-code for the protocol, named
RPBS-(α,ζ), can be found in Figure 9. Next, we prove the correctness of specific instances of
the protocol for Byzantine systems that provide either cluster signing or replica signing:
Proposition 6.5. Let S be a system with Byzantine failures and let C1, C2 ∈ S, σ2 as defined
in Theorem 4.1, and τ2 as defined in Theorem 4.2.
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1. If S provides cluster signing and σ2 ≤ nC2, then RPBS-(σ2,bcs) satisfies Definition 2.1.
The protocol sends σ2 messages, of size O(‖v‖) each, between C1 and C2.
2. If S provides replica signing and τ2 ≤ nC2, then RPBS-(τ2,brs) satisfies Definition 2.1.
The protocol sends τ2 messages, of size O(‖v‖) each, between C1 and C2.
Proof. Let β = nfC1 and γ = 1 in the case of cluster signing and let β = (nfC1 − fC1) and
γ = 2 in the case of replica signing. Let q = (fC2 + 1) div β and r = (fC2 + 1) modβ. We have
α = qnC1 + r + γfC1 sgn r. Choose P and choose partition(P) = {P1, . . . , Pq, P ′} in accordance
with RPBS-(α,ζ). For each P ∈ P, choose a Q and b in accordance with RPBS-(α,ζ), and let
z(P ) = {r ∈ P | b−1(r) ∈ f(Q)}. As each such b−1 has a distinct domain, the union of them is a
surjection f−1 : P → nC1 . By construction, we have nP ′ = r + γfC1 sgn r, nz(P ′) ≤ fC1 sgn r, and,
for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ q, nPi = nC1 and nz(Pi) = fC1 . Let T = P \
(⋃
P∈partition(P) z(P )
)
. We have
nT ≥ nP−(qfC1+fC1 sgn r) = (qnC1+r+γfC1 sgn r)−(qfC1+fC1 sgn r) = qnfC1+r+(γ−1)fC1 sgn r.
To complete the proof, we consider cluster signing and replica signing separately.
First, the case for cluster signing. We have β = nfC1 and γ = 1. Hence,
nT ≥ qnfC1 + r + (γ − 1)fC1 sgn r = qβ + r = fC2 + 1.
We have nfT ≥ nT − fC2 ≥ 1. Let V = {f−1(r) | r ∈ nf(T )}. By construction, we have
nfV = nV and we have nfV ≥ 1. Consequently, the replicas in nf(T ) will receive the messages
(v, 〈v〉C1) from the replicas r1 ∈ V . Analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.1, we can prove
receipt, confirmation, and agreement.
Finally, the case for replica signing. We have β = nfC1 − fC1 and γ = 2. Hence,
nT ≥ qnfC1 + r + (γ − 1)fC1 sgn r = q(β + fC1) + r + fC1 sgn r
= (qβ + r) + qfC1 + fC1 sgn r = (fC2 + 1) + qfC1 + fC1 sgn r.
We have nfT ≥ qfC1 + fC1 sgn r + 1 = (q + sgn r)fC1 + 1. As there are (q + sgn r) non-empty sets
in partition(P), there must be a set P ∈ P with nP∩nfT ≥ fC1 + 1. Let b be the bijection chosen
earlier for P and let V = {b−1(r) | r ∈ (P ∩ nfT )}. By construction, we have nfV = nV and we
have nfV ≥ fC1 + 1. Consequently, the replicas in nf(T ) will receive the messages (v, 〈v〉r1) from
each replica r1 ∈ V . Hence, analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.2, we can prove receipt,
confirmation, and agreement.
As with BS-brs, SPBS-(τ1,brs) and RPBS-(τ2,brs) can be optimized for the case in which
replica certificates have constant size. In these cases, we only let σ1 or σ2 replicas send the value
v, respectively, while all τ1 and τ2 replicas send a replica certificate, respectively.
The bijective sending cluster-sending protocols, the sender-partitioned bijective cluster-
sending protocols, and the receiver-partitioned bijective cluster-sending protocols each deal with
differently-sized clusters. Furthermore, we can use the protocols designed with cluster certificates
in mind also in the other cases using the cluster certificate emulation strategies discussed in
Section 2. By choosing the applicable protocols, we have the following:
Theorem 6.6. Let S be a system and let C1, C2 ∈ S. Consider the cluster-sending problem in
which C1 sends a value v to C2.
1. If nC > 3fC, C ∈ S, and S has crash failures, omit failures, or Byzantine failures and
cluster signing, then BS-bcs, SPBS-(σ1,bcs), and RPBS-(σ2,bcs) are a solution to the
cluster-sending problem with optimal message complexity. These protocols solve the cluster-
sending problem using O(max(nC1 ,nC2)) messages, of size O(‖v‖) each.
2. If nC > 4fC, C ∈ S, and S has Byzantine failures and replica sending, then BS-brs,
SPBS-(τ1,brs), and RPBS-(τ2,brs) are a solution to the cluster-sending problem with
optimal replica certificate usage. These protocols solve the cluster-sending problem using
O(max(nC1 ,nC2)) messages, of size O(‖v‖) each.
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3. If nC > 3fC, C ∈ S, and S has Byzantine failures and replica sending, then BS-bcs,
SPBS-(σ1,bcs), and RPBS-(σ2,bcs) are a solution to the cluster-sending problem. These
protocols solve the cluster-sending problem using O(max(nC1 ,nC2)) messages, of size
O(‖v‖+ fC1) each.
7 Conclusions and discussion
In this paper, we formalized the cluster-sending problem, the problem of sending messages
between clusters that can have faulty replicas. We proved fundamental lower bounds on the
complexity of the cluster-sending problem. We also developed two powerful techniques, bijective
sending and partitioned bijective sending, that can be used in the construction of practical
cluster-sending protocols with optimal complexity. Our work provides a strong foundation for the
further exploration of novel designs that address challenges encountered in resilient distributed
systems. These fundamental results open a number of key research avenues.
First, the optimal protocols we propose apply to most practical situations, but in some
extreme cases only the straightforward broadcasting-based protocols are applicable. It remains
open whether we can improve on these broadcast-based protocols in all cases. Second, based on
the assumptions made in this paper, we also foresee three fundamental opportunities for further
study and development:
(1) The presence of public-key cryptography (replica signing or cluster signing). Without these
tools, each replica can only reliable detect the sender of messages it receives from other
non-faulty replicas and forwarding messages becomes much harder. Hence, we can only
imagine a significant increase in the complexity of the cluster-sending problem.
(2) We operate in a fully dynamic failure model in which the set of faulty replicas is ever
changing. The leader-less protocols we designed operate perfectly under this restriction.
In many practical settings the set of faulty replicas is relatively stable, however. It
remains open to what degree cluster-sending can be optimized to such an optimistic
assumption about failures to reduce the expected complexity. As an example, we mention
the usage of a dedicated reliable leader responsible for coordinating incoming and outgoing
communication. Such a design, with all its challenges, has already seen limited usage in
scalable BFT systems such as Steward [1].
(3) Going beyond reliable networks. Assuming that the network is reliable enabled us to
design one-way protocols without any message acknowledgement phases. Consequently,
the protocols we present leverage network reliability to provide confirmation. Alternatively,
our protocols can be extended to provide a best-case effort to detect and recover from
network unreliability (as far as possible [7, 8, 18]), which necessitates communication in
both directions and will affect the lower bounds on the complexity of cluster-sending.
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